How Stories Work by Manipulating What We Don’t Know. Gaps as the Generators of Narrativity

Abstract

The article discusses Meir Sternberg’s theory of gaps, in particular regarding the fundamental linkage it establishes between gaps and narrativity. The focus is on three distinctive characteristics of Sternberg’s approach. First, he conceives of gaps as referential (i.e., relating to the storyworld) – as distinct, for example, from Wolfgang Iser, for whom ‘gaps’ designate pretty much whatever the text has left unsaid or unconnected. Second, Sternberg makes a clear distinction between relevant and irrelevant informational lacunae – ‘gaps’ vs. ‘blanks’ or ‘indeterminacies’ (the latter category being largely parallel to Roman Ingarden’s Unbestimmtheitsstellen). Finally, Sternberg recognizes three types of narrative gaps, in accordance with the three master-types of interest that, according to him, constitute narrativity: suspense, curiosity, and surprise. Of these, curiosity gaps, as being both perceptible (as opposed to surprise) and past-oriented (as opposed to suspense) tend to be perceived as prototypical, often to the detriment of the two other types, even though all three are structurally and functionally interrelated. Trying to somewhat redress this imbalance, the article concludes by illustrating the importance of considering the future-oriented suspense gaps.